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REGULATION OF IMPORTERS UNDER THE CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
The Consumer Product Safety Act of 19721 is the first comprehensive
product safety legislation to be enacted by Congress.2 It applies to a wide
range of products,3 both imported and domestic,' and subjects parties
who manufacture and distribute these products to a pervasive regula-
tory scheme. The Act creates a Consumer Product Safety Commission
with power to promulgate product safety standards and take steps to
protect the public from hazardous products.
For the importer, the Act is of the utmost significance. With its un-
precedented scope of product coverage, the Act subjects the majority of
importers to its stringent provisions. The importer who fails to comply
1. Consumer Product Safety Act, 86 Stat. 1207, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (Supp. IV,
1974). Hereinafter, all section references are to particular provisions in the Act, unless
otherwise specified.
For general treatments of the Consumer Product Safety Act, see BUREAU OF NAT'L
AFFAIRS. ABC's OF THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT (1973); BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT: TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1973);
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT (Scher, Chairman, Practising Law Institute 1973);
DEVELOPING TRENDS UNDER THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT (Scher, Chairman, Prac-
tising Law Institute 1974).
2. Section 2(a)(5) states that "existing Federal authority to protect consumers from
exposure to consumer products presenting unreasonable risks of injury is inadequate..."
See also BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT: TEXT, ANALYSIS,
LECISLATIVR HISTORY 3 (1973).
Product safety legislation prior to this Act, e.g., the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1191 et seq. (1970), the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et seq.
(1970), the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq. (1970), and the
Household Refrigerator Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1211 et seq. (1970), covered restricted categories
of products, and responsibility for enforcing them was scattered among a number of
federal agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Com-
merce. See generally H. HEFFRON, FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION (Nat'l Comm'n
on Product Safety 1970). Section 30 of the Act transfers the responsibility for administer-
ing the above four acts to the Consumer Product Safety Commission. These acts are
therefore often referred to as the "transferred acts."
3. "Consumer product," which is defined in section 3(a)(1), includes most articles
produced for consumer use. The major exceptions are food, drugs, tobacco products, motor
vehicles, aircraft, and certain boats and vessels.
4. According to Lawrence Kushner, Vice Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, estimates have been made which indicate that at least fifty percent of the
items subject to the Commission's jurisdiction may be imported products. 2 BNA PROD.
SAFETY & LIAR. REP. 501 (1974).
5. Section 3(a)(4) defines "manufacturer" as "any person who manufactures or imports
a consumer product." (emphasis supplied). The definition is important, since the Act
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with the Act will face sanctions which will frequently result in substan-
tial business losses on his part. Moreover, the importer will bear the
brunt of these sanctions even where another party, such as the foreign
manufacturer, is initially or primarily at fault. The situation is further
complicated by the fact that the Act contains various ambiguities con-
cerning import regulation, the resolution of which will significantly af-
fect the importer's liabilities. This Note will examine the Act's impact
upon the importer in each stage of the importation process and will
suggest ways in which the importer can minimize his risks under the
Act. To the extent that the importer can anticipate the legal problems
raised by the Act, he will be able to act accordingly to prevent their
occurrence.
THE ACT'S REGULATION OF THE IMPORTER'S CONDUCT
A. THE IMPORT CONTROL SCHEME PRIOR TO THE ACT
In order to understand the impact of the Act upon the importer's
activities, it is first necessary to examine the import control scheme
existing prior to the Act's passage. The importer has traditionally oper-
ated under an extensive body of statutes and regulations governing the
importation of goods into the United States.7
Under the general procedures prescribed by these laws, imported
goods are subject to various types of clearance upon arrival in this coun-
try. The products may initially be held under Customs custody8 and
stored in a Customs warehouse or a private or public bonded warehouse
designated by Customs. 9 Under the Tariff Act, however, the importer is
allowed to secure the release of his product by posting a redelivery
bond.'" In practice, goods arriving in this country are often immediately
released under bond or delivered directly to the importer, who posts a
bond, without ever having been held under Customs custody."
contains a number of provisions which use the term "manufacturer."
For a prior treatment of importers under the Act, see BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT: TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 11, 75-80 (1973).
6. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1970), a provision of the Tariff Act permitting Customs
custody of imported merchandise to ensure compliance with the applicable laws and
regulations, and 21 U.S.C. § 381 (1970), a Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provision grant-
ing the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare power to test imported food, drugs,
and cosmetics and to refuse their admission.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1970).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1555 (1970).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1970).
11. See Killingsworth, Import Control Under Federal Laws, 2 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.Q.
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The practice of allowing release under bond constitutes a major short-
coming of the traditional scheme of import regulation. The Sixth Circuit
decision in 230 Boxes, More or Less, of Fish v. United States12 held that
if products released under bond are found to be in violation of a perti-
nent statute or regulation Customs does not have the authority, absent
fraud, to compel redelivery of the products to Customs custody. The
only sanction which Customs may invoke for a refusal to comply with
its redelivery request is forfeiture of a portion of the bond.'3 The im-
porter, therefore, might well decide that it would be more profitable to
forfeit a portion of the bond and distribute the product in commerce
rather than to redeliver it to Customs. Although a regulatory agency
with jurisdiction over the goods may in this situation bring an injunctive
or seizure action against the importer," some of the goods may already
have reached the consumer. The weaknesses of this system are espe-
cially apparent where product safety is concerned, since the public is not
afforded adequate protection against exposure to hazardous products.'"
B. IMPACT OF THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT ON IMPORT CONTROL
The Consumer Product Safety Act departs significantly from the pro-
cedures discussed above. Section 17 of the Act permits the Commission
to refuse to admit noncomplying goods and does not give the importer
a general right to obtain the release of goods under bond pending a
determination of their admissibility. This reflects a conscious decision
by Congress to avoid the pitfalls of earlier legislation which contained
general provisions for release under bond 6 because such provisions pro-
vided inadequate protection to the public from hazardous products."
498 (1947).
12. 168 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1948).
13. Id. at 365.
14. Id. at 365-66.
15. For example, the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1191 et seq. (1970), provides
for release under bond.
16. The Department of the Treasury submitted to Congress a proposal concerning
imported products which authorized a general procedure of release under bond as well as
redelivery in instances of noncompliance. Hearings on H.R. 8110, H.R. 8157, H.R. 260,
and H.R. 3813 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 59, pt. 1, at 192-93
(1972). However, this proposal was not incorporated into the final version of the Consumer
Product Safety Act. Although the Senate bill included a general procedure for release
under bond, the House version, which limited this procedure to instances of modification,
was enacted. H.R. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 54-56 (1972), reprinted in [1972] 3
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4596, 4645-46.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 54-56 (1972), [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 4645-46.
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The Act does, however, permit release under bond where the im-
porter, pursuant to an agreement with the Commission, undertakes
modification of his product to bring it into compliance with the Act.'
In this situation the danger that the importer will forfeit the bond and
distribute the product is theoretically reduced, since under section 17(d)
Customs and the Commission are jointly responsible for supervision of
modification. If the product is released under bond for purposes of modi-
fication and it subsequently appears to the Commission that the prod-
uct cannot be modified or that satisfactory progress is not being made,
the Commission may direct Customs to demand redelivery.15 If the im-
porter then refuses to redeliver the product, the Commission is author-
ized to bring seizure and injunctive proceedings. 8
Although section 17 does not expressly authorize release under bond
in instances other than modification, this does not mean that products
covered by the Act will necessarily have to be held in Customs custody
upon arrival in the United States. Where the Commission does not
suspect a violation and does not request that Customs retain custody of
the product,2 Customs may choose to release the goods under a redeliv-
ery bond authorized by another statute such as the Tariff Act.2" This
situation may arise frequently, since the Commission will probably test
only a small proportion of imported products. In practice, then, section
17 may well have less impact on importation procedures than its strong
language would indicate.
C. GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL OF ADMISSION
These restrictions on the flow of imported goods into the United
States operate in a variety of situations. Section 17(a), which lists the
general grounds for restriction, provides that a product will be denied
admission into the United States if it does not comply with an applica-
ble product safety rule promulgated by the Commission, does not meet
the Act's certification and labeling requirements, is or has been deter-
mined to be an "imminent product hazard," has a product defect which
constitutes a "substantial product hazard," or was manufactured by a
person who did not comply with section 17(g), which authorizes the
18. Section 17(c).
19. Section 17(d).
20. Id.
21. In a policy statement the Commission indicated that the importer may not be
required to hold the entire shipment intact pending the outcome of tests on product
samples, since for routine compliance checks this would discriminate against the im-
porter. 3 BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 390 (1975).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1970). See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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Commission to condition the importation of products on the "manufac-
turer's" l compliance with inspection and recordkeeping requirements.
Thus, as the last ground for refusal indicates, a product may be refused
admission even when the product itself is not defective. Section 17 also
provides that the importer may be required to provide product samples
to the Commission so that the latter can make a determination as to
whether the product is hazardous." These grounds for refusal of admis-
sion are treated more extensively elsewhere in the Act: specific sections
concern product safety rules,n banned hazardous products,2 imminent
product hazards,2 and substantial product hazards.?
The Act's certification and recordkeeping requirements are also sig-
nificant for the importer. The Consumer Product Safety Commission is
authorized to require that goods subject to a product safety standard be
accompanied by a certificate which specifies the applicable standards
and indicates compliance. 29 Certification must be based on a test of each
product or on a reasonable testing program, which the Commission may
prescribe. 0 The Commission is also empowered to designate the party
responsible for certification.3 ' Besides certification, the Commission
may impose labeling requirements on products subject to the Act; such
requirements, unlike certification, may be applicable regardless of
whether the goods are covered by a product safety standard.32 Finally,
23. This includes the importer's compliance with such requirements. See note 5 supra.
24. Under section 17(b) Customs obtains samples pursuant to a request from the Com-
mission and forwards the samples to the Commission.
25. Sections 7-11 prescribe the procedures for promulgation of product safety standards.
For a discussion of the standards-setting process, see Scalia & Goodman, Procedural
Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 899 (1973). See also
Page, Consumer Involvement and the Consumer Product Safety Act, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv.
605 (1974).
26. Section 8.
27. Section 12.
28. Section 15.
29. Section 14.
30. Section 14(b).
31. The Commission is authorized to impose testing and certification requirements on
the importer as well as the foreign manufacturer. Under section 14(a)(2) if there is more
than one "manufacturer" or product labeler the Commission may designate one or more
of such parties as the person responsible for certification and may exempt all other "manu-
facturers" or private labelers from this responsibility. Since "manufacturer" includes
importers as well, see note 5 supra, the Commission can hold the importer responsible for
certification. Even if the importer is not subject to any such requirements, he may still
want to test the product in order to guard against sanctions such as refusal of admission
and seizure actions, especially if he has reason to believe that the foreign manufacturer is
failing to comply with the Commission's testing standards. See note 99 infra and accompa-
nying text.
32. Section 14(c).
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the Commission has the authority to require that the importer maintain
certain records and provide information upon the Commission's request,
and it may inspect the importer's records and facilities.3
Refusal of admission imposes a special burden on the importer, for the
sanction is applicable regardless of whether the importer or another
party such as the foreign manufacturer is primarily at fault." If the
foreign manufacturer, for example, has failed to test his products in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Commission or has refused
to comply with recordkeeping requirements, the products will be refused
admission even though noncompliance cannot be attributed to the im-
porter. 5 Thus, before entering into a transaction with a foreign manu-
facturer or exporter, the importer should ascertain whether the other
party is aware of, and willing to comply with, the pertinent require-
ments of the Act.
36
33. Section 16.
34. The importer is subject to the sanction of admission refusal even where he does not
know and could not reasonably be expected to know of the foreign manufacturer's noncom-
pliance. Under section 19(b), however, the importer is not liable for civil or criminal
penalties in such a situation.
35. One of the major advantages of this sanction is that it can be directed against
foreign manufacturers who do not fall within the Commission's personal jurisdiction.
36. See note 99 infra and accompanying text. With regard to the Act's regulation of
foreign manufacturers' conduct, the Department of State has commented that
"[ilnspection of [foreign manufacturers' facilities and records] may raise delicate ques-
tions of national sovereignty and might strain our relations with our trading partners." 2
BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 841 (1974). However, Barbara Franklin, Vice Chairman
of the Commission, has indicated that the Commission has no current plans to inspect
the facilities of foreign manufacturers. 2 CCH CONSUMERIsM 730 (1974). The Department
of State has also warned that if the Commission subjects imported products to any man-
datory plans for sampling and testing, this will lead to retaliation by other nations. The
Department suggested that imports be exempt from any such sampling plans and that
the Commission accept the results of equivalent tests in the country of origin. 2 BNA
PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 841 (1974).
In addition to raising the issue of infringement on the sovereignty of other nations, the
Act's regulation of foreign manufacturers also presents the constitutional question of
whether Congress has exceeded its power to regulate foreign commerce. It could be argued
that regulation of foreign manufacturers' activities outside the United States, such as
recordkeeping, is not authorized by the Commerce Clause. However, the foreign manufac-
turer is under no obligation to submit to such regulation in the first place, since he can
decide not to export his products to the United States. Also, courts have characterized
the power of Congress over foreign commerce as plenary. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S.
470 (1904); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). It has been held that
this power may extend to regulating the conduct of foreign companies if such conduct
sufficiently affects foreign commerce. SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1968). In
Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), the court stated in dicta
that Congress' power under the Commerce Clause "is now generally interpreted to extend
to all commerce, even intrastate and entirely foreign commerce, which has a substantial
[Vol. 9:317
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D. OTHER SANCTIONS
Once the goods have been admitted into the United States, the im-
porter is still subject to various enforcement proceedings if the Commis-
sion at any point discovers a violation. The Commission is authorized
to bring judicial seizure proceedings against hazardous products under
section 12(a), to take administrative steps against substantial product
hazards under section 15,11 and to bring injunctive and seizure actions
under section 22 to prevent the distribution of nonconforming prod-
ucts. ",' The importer faces civil penalties under section 20 if he know-
ingly distributes a consumer product which is not in conformity with an
applicable consumer product safety standard or which is a banned haz-
ardous product, fails to comply with inspection and recordkeeping re-
quirements, fails to furnish information required by section 15(b) with
respect to substantial product hazards, fails to comply with an adminis-
trative order under section 15(c) or 15(d) concerning substantial product
hazards, or fails to comply with any rule under section 9(d) (2) involving
stockpiling of goods. 9 In addition, the importer is subject to criminal
penalties under section 21 if he knowingly and willfully continues to
commit a prohibited act after having received a notice of noncompliance
from the Commission. In some instances the Commission will have to
resort to more than one sanction in enforcing the Act. For example, an
importer may disobey a redelivery order under section 17, in which case
the Commission can bring injunctive and seizure proceedings and assess
criminal penalties. A given sanction, then, can be reinforced by the
threat and use of other sanctions."
effect on commerce between the states or between the United States and foreign coun-
tries." Id. at 641.
37. Actions under section 15 will typically be taken against products that are "already
on the dealer's shelves or in the consumer's hands." Scalia & Goodman, supra note 25, at
940. This includes imported products that were admitted into the United States and
distributed in commerce.
38. Section 22 and section 12 proceedings are similar in that both involve injunctive
enforcement and/or seizure of the product. However, there are some important differences.
While section 22 applies to banned hazardous products and products that violate a con-
sumer product safety standard, section 12 concerns imminent product hazards, which may
or may not be subject to a product safety standard. Also, the Commission does not have
to obtain authorization from the Attorney General in order to bring a section 12 action,
but must do so for injunctive proceedings under section 22. Finally, a proceeding under
section 12(a) may be brought notwithstanding pending judicial or administrative actions.
For a discussion of the differences between section 12 and section 22 proceedings, see Note,
The Consumer Product Safety Act: Bold New Approaches to Regulatory Theory, 5 LOYOLA
U. OF CHI. L.J. 447, 459 (1974).
39. Section 19(a) provides that these constitute prohibited acts.
40. In addition to prescribing various sanctions that the Commission may invoke, the
1976]
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II
LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVING REGULATION OF THE
IMPORTER
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 15 AND SECTION 17
Several provisions of the Act contain a number of ambiguities which
present significant legal problems to the importer. One of the major
ambiguities concerns the context in which the Commisssion can make
an initial decision that goods should not be admitted. This problem
becomes especially apparent when the Commission bases its decision on
section 17(a)(4), which states that a product shall be refused admission
if it "has a product defect which constitutes a substantial product haz-
ard (within the meaning of section 15(a)(2)). . . ." Section 15(a)(2), in
turn, defines a substantial product hazard as a "product defect which
(because of the pattern of defect, the number of defective products
distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates
a substantial risk of injury to the public."'" The Act is unclear as to
whether a product can be refused admission on this ground when no
opportunity for a section 15 hearing has previously been provided. This
issue would most likely manifest itself in the following situation: The
Commission decides that certain goods distributed in commerce consti-
tute a substantial product hazard within the meaning of section
15(a)(2).2 It then contacts the distributor and convinces him to take
appropriate action with respect to the nonconforming products. No sec-
tion 15 hearing will have occurred, since the problem is resolved by
informal means. Subsequently, however, the distributor or another indi-
vidual imports the identical product and the Commission directs Cus-
toms to refuse admission on the grounds that the product is a substan-
tial product hazard. 3
Act provides in section 23 that a party injured by a knowing violation of a product safety
rule may bring a private action for damages. This remedy is in addition to, and not in
lieu of, other common law and statutory remedies. Also, section 24 authorizes a private
party to bring an action to enforce a product safety rule or an administrative order
concerning substantial product hazards.
41. Under section 15(a)(1) a product may also constitute a substantial product hazard
if it fails to comply with an applicable product safety standard. Section 17(a)(1) provides
that such a product shall be refused admission into the United States.
42. The Commission would make such a decision with respect to either products of
domestic origin or imported goods admitted into the United States.
43. In the situation where a section 15 hearing with respect to a certain product did take
place, it would appear that a subsequent importer of identical goods would nonetheless
still have a right to a formal hearing under section 17(b). The only exception to this right
in section 17(b) is in situations where the importer has previously had an opportunity for
a hearing with regard to imminently hazardous products.
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Although under section 15(f) the Commission can issue a section 15
order concerning substantial product hazards only after it has provided
an opportunity for a formal hearing,44 the language of section 17 sup-
ports the contention that products can be refused admission without a
prior section 15 hearing. Section 17(a)(4) makes no reference to the
procedures delineated in section 15; the only reference is to the
definition of substantial product hazard in section 15(a)(2).11 Also, sec-
tion 17(a)(4) states that a product shall be refused admission if it has a
product defect that "constitutes" a substantial product hazard, in con-
trast with analogous language in section 17(a)(3), which states that a
product shall be refused admission if it "is or has been determined to
be an imminently hazardous consumer product in a proceeding brought
under section 12." The lack of the phrase "is or has been determined"
in section 17(a)(4) indicates that under this section a prior hearing is
not required. Moreover, under section 17(b) a product shall be refused
admission if "it appears. . . that a product must be refused admission
under the terms of subsection (a)."46 In Sugarman v. Forbragd,7 it was
held that the use of "appears" in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
meant that a product could be refused admission on grounds of adulter-
ation without any formal hearing whatsoever. The term "appears" in
section 17(b) similarly indicates that no prior determination as to sub-
stantial product hazards is necessary, although the importer would have
a right to a section 17 hearing after the Commission decides not to admit
the goods.
In addition to the language of section 17, there are two major policy
reasons for not requiring a prior formal hearing in this situation. First,
44. A formal hearing in this context refers to a hearing which is governed by the require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Administrative Procedure Act].
45. Section 15 proceedings will be initiated in different situations than the section 17
remedy. See note 37 supra.
46. (Emphasis supplied). The question arises as to how the word "appears" in section
17(b) can be reconciled with the "is or has been determined" language of section 17(a)(3),
regarding imminent product hazards. The Commission might, for example, deny admis-
sion of a product on the grounds that it is identical to an item which was previously
determined to be an imminent product hazard. The fact that the product "appears" to
have been covered by the prior determination would, in the Commission's view, serve as
a sufficient basis for refusal of admission. This could place the importer who had pre-
viously been a party to a section 12 proceeding (concerning imminent product hazards)
at a substantial disadvantage, since under section 17(b) he would not be entitled to a
formal hearing with regard to the admissibility of the product.
47. 267 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969).
48. Id. at 824.
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such a requirement would lead to a needless multiplicity of hearings,
since the same issue-whether a product was a substantial product
hazard-would be adjudicated in both a section 15 and a section 17
hearing."5 Second, the Commission's powers under section 17 would be
considerably weakened, since the product would first have to be admit-
ted, if no prior hearing had occurred, before the Commission could take
any action. The Act's intent to protect the public from exposure to
product hazards 0 would be frustrated if the Commission was unable to
take steps to halt distribution at the earliest possible point in the impor-
tation process.
B. DETENTION OF GOODS
1. Detention Pending the Outcome of Tests and Hearings
In situations such as that discussed above, the Commission might
initially suspect that a ground for refusal of admission exists but will
want to perform tests on product samples in order to make a definite
decision as to admissibility.5' The Act is unclear as to whether goods can
be detained pending the outcome of such tests. However, since Congress
deliberately refused to include a general provision authorizing release
under bond, the Commission apparently would have the authority to
direct Customs to hold the goods in its custody pending the outcome of
tests. 52 The goods will thus be detained at this point unless the importer
decides to re-export the products. The Commission will subsequently
take one of the following steps as a result of tests performed on product
samples: (1) if the goods are in compliance, request that Customs re-
lease them,5 3 (2) if a violation is discovered, enter into negotiations with
49. The Commission could only issue an administrative order under sections 15(c)-(d)
or refuse admission under section 17(a)(4) if the product was indeed determined to be a
substantial product hazard. Therefore, this issue would be central to both section 15 and
section 17 hearings.
50. See notes 2 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
51. The Commission will not restrict testing to instances where a violation is suspected;
it will also make routine compliance checks. See note 21 supra.
52. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. Although the Act does not contain a
general provision for release under bond, several of the "transferred acts," supra note 2,
do provide for release under bond in such situations. Thus, it is doubtful whether the
Commission can order Customs to hold the goods in Customs custody if the Commission
is acting under any of these acts. Section 30(d) is pertinent in this regard; it provides that
"[al risk of injury which is associated with consumer products and which could be
eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by action taken under the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, or the Flammable Fabrics
Act may be regulated by the Commission only in accordance with the provisions of those
Acts."
53. Customs would not appear to have any authority to refuse to release goods if it is
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the importer to allow modification of the goods, in which case the goods
could be released under bond, or (3) if modification would not be feasi-
ble, decide that the goods should permanently be refused admission. If
the Commission denies admission of the goods, the importer has an
opportunity for a formal hearing under section 17(b). The Act does not
provide for release under bond during such a hearing, 4 and in fact
section 17(d) states that products released under bond for purposes of
modification must be redelivered to Customs if the Commission deter-
mines that the modification is infeasible or unsatisfactory. The prod-
ucts will then remain in Customs custody pending the subsequent hear-
ing. Otherwise, products could be distributed in commerce during a
hearing which purportedly is determining their admissibility into the
United States.
2. Redelivery and Detention
Although the Act is quite explicit with regard to redelivery of goods
released under bond for purposes of modification, it is more ambiguous
with respect to redelivery in other situations. In some instances, the
Commission will not discover a violation until after the goods have been
released under a bond authorized by another statute such as the Tariff
Act. 15 In this situation the Act, although it does not explicitly provide a
remedy, also does not ipso facto prevent the Commission from making
a redelivery request to Customs. In view of the Act's purpose to establish
a Commission with strong enforcement powers and its emphasis upon
cooperation between the Commission and Customs,56 the Commission
may make reasonable requests to Customs for assistance in preventing
violations of the Act. Since the Act does not require redelivery in instan-
ces other than modification, however, Customs would not be obliged to
comply with a redelivery request in these situations and might even
decide that redelivery would be unwarranted in a particular instance5 1
or that it might not want to be burdened with the responsibilities asso-
ciated with redelivery.55 In these situations, as a consequence, the Com-
notified by the appropriate agencies that the goods are in compliance with applicable
statutes and regulations. See 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1970).
54. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
55. 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1970). See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 62 infra.
57. Customs might, for example, regard redelivery as inappropriate where the importer
did not violate a statute such as the Tariff Act or the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
authorizes the redelivery bond.
58. Under the holding in 230 Boxes, More or Less, of Fish v. United States, 168 F.2d
361 (6th Cir. 1948), Customs does not have the authority to compel compliance with its
redelivery requests. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text. Thus, even if Customs
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mission might well decide to invoke its own enforcement powers and
issue administrative orders59 or bring judicial, proceedings against the
importer." This would provide a more direct and reliable means of en-
forcing the Act than would the redelivery procedures.
3. Authority of Customs to Detain Goods Without a Prior Request
from the Commission
Redelivery and detention of goods will characteristically involve joint
action by the Commission and Customs; the Commission will direct
Customs to take appropriate steps with respect to the nonconforming
products."' The Act does not specify, however, whether Customs may
under any circumstances detain products without a prior request from
the Commission. Despite the frequent provisions in section 17 for coop-
eration between Customs and the Commission,"2 the Act does not ap-
pear to prevent Customs from detaining goods without prior authoriza-
tion. Indeed, the Act's policy of providing adequate protection to the
public63 will be promoted if Customs is allowed to detain goods on its
own, since Customs will at times be in a better position than the Com-
mission to discover violations of the Act. For example, Customs can
more readily ascertain whether imported goods are accompanied by the
proper certification documents and labels. 4 If Customs could not detain
agrees to demand redelivery the possibility remains that the importer will ignore the
request and distribute the goods, thereby forfeiting a portion of the bond. In this case the
Commission would have to resort to injunctive or seizure proceedings, or administrative
orders such as product recalls.
59. Section 15.
60. Sections 12 & 22.
61. Section 17(d) provides that the Commission may direct Customs to demand redeliv-
ery of the product into Customs custody.
62. This emphasis is reflected not only in the redelivery provision but also in other parts
of section 17. Section 17(a)(5) states that a product shall be refused admission when it
was manufactured by a person "who the Commission has informed the Secretary of the
Treasury is in violation of subsection (g) of this section [involving compliance with
inspection and recordkeeping requirements]." Under section 17(b) Customs shall deliver
samples to the Commission upon the latter's request. Section 17(c) provides that Customs
shall release the goods under bond for purposes of modification pursuant to a request by
the Commission, and under section 17(d) Customs and the Commission are jointly respon-
sible for supervision of such modification. Finally, if the importer whose products are in
Customs custody does not comply with a re-exportation order by the Commission within
a reasonable time, Customs is required to destroy the product under section 17(e).
63. See notes 2 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
64. Customs would probably have received initial instructions from the Commission
with respect to certification and labeling requirements. Subsequently, however, the re-
sponsibility would fall on Customs to ascertain whether the requirements are satisfied in
each instance.
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goods without prior authorization where it discovers such noncompli-
ance, then the Act would be considerably weakened.
In addition to its implicit authorization under section 17, Customs is
also authorized under section 499 of the Tariff Act to detain goods with-
out prior authorization. This section provides in pertinent part that:
Imported merchandise, required by law or regulations made in pursu-
ance thereof to be inspected, examined, or appraised, shall not be deliv-
ered from customs custody, except under such bond or other security as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. . .until it has been
inspected, examined, or appraised and is found to comply with the re-
quirements of the laws of the United States.'5
As this provision indicates, the only prerequisite for detention by Cus-
toms is that there be an applicable law or regulation; there is no require-
ment that another agency request detention. The Customs regulations
further provide that an action by a Customs officer is not invalid even
though a statute or regulation states that another person is responsible
for taking such action." Even if the Consumer Product Safety Act is
construed as placing responsibility on the Commission for authorizing
detentions, therefore, the Customs regulations would validate such an
action by Customs.
4. Due Process Ramifications of Detentions Under Section 17
Since detentions will take place pursuant to an initial decision by the
Commission or Customs, they will generally be ex parte in nature, and
the importer will have an opportunity for a hearing only after the deten-
tion has begun. This raises the issue of whether the importer is denied
procedural due process in such a situation.
The constitutional validity of ex parte detentions must be considered
in light of the plenary power of Congress over foreign commerce. 7 The
interest of the government in regulating foreign commerce and protect-
ing the public has traditionally been weighed more heavily than the
importer's property interest in the goods: as Justice Frankfurter stated
in his concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, "[tlhe importation of goods is a privilege which, if Congress
clearly so directs, may . . .be conditioned on ex parte findings."6 In
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1970).
66. 19 C.F.R. § 1.1(a)-(b) (1975).
67. See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Sugarman v. Forbragd, 267 F.
Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
960 (1969); The James J. Hill, 65 F. Supp. 265 (D. Md. 1946).
68. 341 U.S. 123, 167 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Cafeteria Workers,
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1960), in which the Supreme Court stated that
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Sugarman v. Forbragd,9 for example, a District Court upheld an ex
parte detention scheme under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in
which the procedural requirements were less rigorous than under the
Consumer Product Safety Act." Nevertheless, in recent years the Su-
preme Court has subjected various ex parte provisional remedies to close
constitutional scrutiny and in some cases has held such remedies to be
invalid on due process grounds." Where the Court has upheld the chal-
lenged remedy, as in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,72 the statute in ques-
tion contained a number of procedural safeguards: the petitioner was
required to make specific factual allegations before a judge to obtain the
provisional writ, the petitioner had to post a bond, and the other party
had an immediate opportunity for a hearing.73 The Consumer Product
Safety Act lacks these safeguards; the Commission and Customs do not
have to make any preliminary factual showing in order to detain the
goods, they do not have to post a bond or other indemnification, and the
hearing does not have to occur immediately after detention begins.
Moreover, the commercial, as opposed to consumer, status of the im-
porter does not necessarily validate ex parte detentions. In North Geor-
gia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ,7 the Supreme Court held that a
corporation was entitled to procedural safeguards in view of the irrepar-
able injury that it might suffer as a result of initial error." This analysis
would apply to the importer, who faces the possibility of irreparable
injury as a result of ex parte detention since his goods could become
"[wihere it has been possible to characterize that private interest. . . as a mere privilege
subject to the Executive's plenary power, it has traditionally been held that notice and
hearing are not constitutionally required." Id. at 895.
69. 267 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
70. Under the scheme considered in Sugarman an importer's goods could be refused
admission after only an informal hearing, which would occur after initial detention of the
goods. Section 17(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, by contrast, gives the importer
an opportunity for a formal hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
554 (1970). This requires the administrative interpretation to be made on the record and
permits judicial review.
71. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (statute authorizing ex parte
wage garnishment held invalid on due process grounds); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1971) (statutes authorizing prejudgment replevin invalidated on due process grounds);
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1974) (statute authorizing
ex parte garnishment of bank accounts held invalid on due process grounds).
72. 416 U.S. 600 (1973). This case distinguished Fuentes and upheld a statute authoriz-
ing prejudgment replevin.
73. Id. at 605-606.
74. 419 U.S. 601 (1974).
75. Id. at 608.
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unmarketable due to such factors as adverse publicity and high storage
costs.
On behalf of the Commission, it could be argued that there are several
substantial distinctions between ex parte detentions and the provisional
remedies involved in the Supreme Court cases. One major difference,
noted above, is the plenary power of Congress over importation and the
paramount public interest in product safety.76 In addition, detention of
goods does not involve an actual taking of property in the sense of
garnishment or replevin, since theoretically the importer is still free to
re-export the goods or modify the products to bring them into compli-
ance with the Act. Nevertheless, in actual fact these alternatives may
not be available. The goods may have become worthless, and the costs
of modification may be prohibitive. The importer, therefore, will have
suffered a very real deprivation of property. Thus, even though ex parte
detentions do not appear invalid per se, due process would seem to
require that the importer be provided some protections against losses
resulting from an erroneous decision on the part of the Commission.
C. FORMAL AND INFORMAL HEARINGS UNDER SECTION 17
1. The Problem of Delay in Formal Hearings
One protection which the Act does contain is the opportunity for a full
formal hearing under section 17(b). Even under this scheme, however,
the importer may still undergo substantial hardships due to the length
of the hearing process and the consequent extended period of detention.
The Administrative Procedure Act, which prescribes the procedures for
formal hearings, reflects an awareness of the problems associated with
delay and provides that "[imn fixing the time and place for hearings,
due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the
parties or their representatives."7 This does not necessarily guarantee
the importer an opportunity for a prompt hearing, however, because
under this provision the administrative agency may take into account
its own convenience as well as that of the other parties. Even if the
hearing does begin promptly, it will frequently extend over a lengthy
period of time since it is formal in nature and has to meet the extensive
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act concerning discovery,
cross-examination, and other such matters.
79
76. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1970).
78. Burnham Trucking Co. v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1963).
79. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)-(d) (1970).
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2. The Informal Hearing
The problem of delay could be minimized in many cases if the Com-
mission offered the importer an opportunity for an informal hearing,"0
which could consist of conferences and negotiations without meeting the
extensive procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Although the Consumer Product Safety Act does not require or author-
ize preliminary informal hearings, it does not prohibit the Commission
from instituting an informal hearing process; section 17(b) states only
that the opportunity for a formal hearing be afforded, not that no other
type of hearing be provided. Further, the Administrative Procedure Act
itself authorizes an informal hearing.8 In addition to these statutory
bases for an informal hearing, there are several policy reasons for such
a procedure. An informal hearing process would save the Commission
considerable time and effort, allow the Commission considerable flexi-
bility in dealing with the importer, and increase the prospects for future
cooperation between the importer and the Commission by reducing the
need for formal hearings, which tend to be more adversarial in nature.
For the importer, an informal hearing process would alleviate the prob-
lem of extended detention of goods as well as the substantial commit-
ment of time and energy that a formal hearing would entail.
The importer could be afforded even greater protection against losses
if the Act were amended to require a prompt preliminary hearing at
which the Commission would be obligated to provide reasons for its
decision to detain the goods." At present the Commission has virtually
unbridled discretion over whether and when to initiate an informal hear-
ing, which means that the importer always faces the possibility of ex-
tended detention before a hearing gets underway or before the final
determination is made. Although a required preliminary hearing would
not eliminate this problem, it would at least afford the importer an
opportunity to present his case to the Commission, learn why the Com-
mission acted as it did, and resolve any misunderstandings that may
have arisen.
3. Waiver of the Right to a Formal Hearing
Situations may arise in which the informal hearing fails to produce
80. The informal hearing would, of course, be optional for the importer; he could decide
that he wants a formal hearing only.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1970) provides in part that "[tihe agency shall give all interested
parties opportunity for. . . the submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers
of settlement, or proposals of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and
the public interest permit .... "
82. The preliminary hearing would not preclude subsequent informal hearings.
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an agreement between the importer and the Commission, and in such
cases the importer will face the issue of whether he has waived his rights
to a formal hearing. If the attempt to reach an agreement by informal
means is initially unsuccessful, the importer will doubtless be entitled
to a formal hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act provision
that "to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a contro-
versy by consent, [the parties are entitled to] hearing and decision on
notice ... "83 The problem of waiver will most likely arise, however,
in situations where the importer becomes dissatisfied with an agreement
or settlement reached at an informal hearing and therefore desires a
formal hearing. A number of cases, most of which involve the National
Labor Relations Board, have dealt with the question of whether a party
can obtain a formal hearing on the basis of his objections to a settlement
or consent order, and the decisions vary on this issue. 4 In any event, if
the waiver resulted from any coercion on the part of the administrative
agency, then the party will be entitled to a formal hearing., If the
83. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(2) (1970).
84. In Teamsters, Local 282 v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964), the court held that
a labor union which had filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the National Labor
Relations Board did not have a right to a formal hearing on the basis of its objections to
the NLRB's consent order. However, the case can be distinguished from the situation of
an importer under the Consumer Product Safety Act since under the National Labor
Relations Act the party filing the initial complaint is not entitled to a formal hearing in
the first place. Id. at 800. Contra, Marine Engineers Ben. Ass'n No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d
546 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953); Leeds & Northrop Co. v. NLRB, 357
F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966). See also NLRB v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 476 F.2d 1031 (1st
Cir. 1973); Textile Workers Union of America v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Concrete Materials of Georgia, Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1971).
In a non-NLRB case, United States Bio-Genics Corp. v. Christenberry, 173 F. Supp.
645 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1960), it was held that a party who had
made an agreement with the Post Office to discontinue certain activities had waived its
right to a formal hearing. The judge remarked: "I know of no doctrine which prevents such
an agreement. . . . Having made such an agreement, having reaped the benefits thereof,
and absent any claim of involuntariness or coercion, may the person then insist that the
waiver be disregarded? I think not. To permit such a volte face would be to destroy the
efficacy of informal hearings with administrative agencies." Id. at 649. In that case the
benefits which plaintiff obtained consisted of the saving of time and expense and avoid-
ance of a finding of fraud by the Post Office which might have an adverse effect on
plaintiff's business. Id. at 649. An importer might be able to distinguish his own situation
by arguing that he has not derived similar benefits from his agreement. Also, the plaintiff
in Bio-Genics urged that the agreement be followed when the Post Office was considering
filing a new complaint, and this might afford another basis for distinguishing the im-
porter's situation.
85. See United States Bio-Genics Corp. v. Christenberry, 173 F. Supp. 645 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1960). For a reference in the legislative history of the
Administrative Procedure Act to the issue of coercion, see H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 233, 281 (1946).
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informal hearing involves different issues and purposes than the formal
hearing, moreover, then the importer apparently will not have waived
his right to the latter. For example, where the importer agrees to modify
the nonconforming products and the Commission subsequently decides
that the modification is infeasible or unsatisfactory, the importer will
undoubtedly have a right to a formal hearing concerning the admissibil-
ity of the goods.86
D. RE-EXPORTATION OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS
1. Seizure and Re-exportation
Rather than submit to the above process of detention and hearings,
an importer might decide that re-exportation of the products would be
a more viable alternative. Where the goods are in Customs custody,
there is no statutory barrier to voluntary re-exportation,87 but situations
could arise in which the importer will want to re-export goods which
have been admitted into the United States and subsequently seized. 8
86. Under section 17(c) by permitting modification the Commission defers final deter-
mination as to admissibility. If the Commission subsequently decides that the product is
inadmissible, the importer will have an opportunity for a formal hearing under section
17(b).
87. Since goods in Customs custody which have been refused admission are subject to
compulsory re-exportation under section 17(e), then an importer whose products are de-
tained by Customs pending a determination of admissibility can decide to voluntarily re-
export the goods.
88. Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman of the Commission, has indicated that under the
Flammable Fabrics Act the Commission will not allow re-exportation of imported goods
that have been admitted to the United States and subsequently seized; the goods will
either be modified or destroyed. However, unlike the Consumer Product Safety Act, the
Flammable Fabrics Act makes no mention of the disposition of nonconforming imported
products, even where the products have been refused admission. The above policy repre-
sents a departure from the practice of the Federal Trade Commission, which formerly
administered the Flammable Fabrics Act, of allowing seized imported goods to be re-
exported. 3 BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 143 (1975). Simpson also remarked that the
Commission is considering applying this policy to products subject to the Consumer
Product Safety Act. Id. at 103. The reason for the Commission's opposition to re-
exportation of seized imported goods, according to Simpson, is that the Commission wants
to motivate importers "to keep non-complying products from entering the marketplace
to begin with." Id.
The question arises of whether nonconforming items imported for processing into fin-
ished products that will be exported are also subject to seizure. This would depend on
whether the goods satisfy the criteria of section 18, which provides in part that the Act
shall not apply to exports "only if. . . it can be shown that such product is manufactured,
sold, or held for sale for export from the United States (or that such product was imported
for export), unless such consumer product is in fact distributed in commerce for use in
the United States ....
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The Act, unlike the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 9 does not contain
any provision which expressly authorizes re-exportation of seized goods
under certain circumstances. It does, however, give the Commission
considerable leeway and flexibility in its enforcement powers,9" so that
the Commission would appear to have discretion over whether to allow
re-exportation. In some situations the importer could make a good case
for re-exportation. For example, if the importer had no knowledge of the
violation when he imported and distributed the product and the Com-
mission subsequently brought a seizure action, a refusal to allow re-
exportation would constitute rather harsh treatment of the importer.
The importer would be placed at a disadvantage simply because the
Commission discovered the violation at a point where the seizure rem-
edy rather than refusal of admission, in which re-exportation would be
permitted, was applicable. On the other hand, if the importer knew of
the noncompliance and nonetheless distributed the product or if he
distributed the product in disregard of a redelivery order, then he would
not have a very convincing case for re-exportation.
2. Re-exportation and Civil Penalties
Not only may re-exportation be impermissible in some instances, but
it also fails to prevent the imposition of civil penalties against the im-
porter when the importer has already committed a prohibited act. For
example, the importer might have knowingly issued a false certificate9'
or refused to permit access to records92 and subsequently re-exported the
products. The Act does not give a party the right to undo or erase
violations by subsequent re-exportation93 since such an avoidance would
89. 21 U.S.C. § 334(d)(1) (1970). Under this provision the importer would have to
establish that the violation did not occur after the article was imported and that he had
no cause for believing that there was a violation before the goods were released from
Customs custody. He would also have to show that various conditions under 21 U.S.C. §
381(d) (1970), which concerns exports, will be met.
For arguments that were made by various importers' associations on behalf of this
provision, see Hearings on H.R. 10519 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
90. See, e.g., sections 15 and 22, which authorize the Commission to impose a number
of sanctions.
91. Section 19(a)(6) makes it unlawful for "any person" to "issue a false certificate if
such person in the exercise of due care has reason to know that such certificate is false or
misleading in any material respect .. "
92. Section 19(a)(3) makes it unlawful for "any person" to "fail or refuse to permit
access to or copying of records . . . as required under this Act. .... "
93. However, in some situations re-exportation will preclude the possibility of civil
liability arising in the first place. For example, one of the acts prohibited by section 19 is
importation of a product which is not in conformity with an applicable consumer product
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derogate from the Act's purpose of providing strong means of enforce-
ment."
III
PLANNING BY THE IMPORTER
The legal problems discussed above underscore the need for the im-
porter to plan in advance to avoid, or at least minimize, losses incurred
as a result of sanctions imposed under the Act. To the extent that the
importer is familiar with the ways in which the Act regulates his activi-
ties, his ability to plan effectively will be enhanced.
Planning cannot be undertaken by the importer alone, but instead
must reflect a joint effort by the importer and parties with whom he
transacts business, such as the foreign manufacturer. Thus, before en-
tering into a contract with the foreign manufacturer, the importer
should discuss the applicable provisions of the Act with the foreign
manufacturer and make sure that the latter is willing to comply. The
Chairman of the Commission has remarked that importers can mini-
mize potential problems by seeking certification from foreign manufac-
turers that the products have been properly tested, or by testing the
products themselves. Since sanctions such as refusal of admission can
be imposed against the importer as a result of the foreign manufac-
turer's noncompliance, these initial steps are crucial.
Another basic thrust of planning involves making an advance decision
as to how losses will be apportioned if and when sanctions are imposed.
safety standard. Section 19(a)(1). If a person imports a product without knowledge of the
noncompliance and immediately re-exports the goods upon discovering it, he will not have
knowingly violated section 19 and will therefore avoid civil penalties.
The importer would rarely be criminally liable under section 21 after re-exportation of
the goods. Under that section those who "knowingly and wilfully" violate section 19 after
having received notice of noncompliance are subject to criminal penalties. The importer
who re-exports the goods after receiving such notice would' not be criminally liable since
he would be complying with a re-exportation order under section 17(e). However, if the
importer disobeys a redelivery or re-exportation order by offering the goods for sale and
then re-exports the goods (assuming they have not been seized) after he is unable to find
any purchasers, then he would probably be held criminally liable since he would have
already committed the criminal act.
94. See notes 2 & 16 supra. See also W.M.R. Watch Case Corp. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 302
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 936 (1965). In that case the petitioners contended
that the conduct in question was voluntarily abandoned before the filing of a complaint
by the Federal Trade Commission. The court replied that "appraisal of the danger that
deception may recur if not forbidden is initially for the Commission. If that danger is
sufficient there is no bar to enforcement merely because the conduct has ceased at least
temporarily under the weight of the Commission's hand." Id. at 304.
95. 3 BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 85 (1975).
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In making contractual arrangements, the importer and foreign manu-
facturer should address themselves to the contingencies in which the
apportionment issue would arise, such as product modification and re-
exportation. For example, the parties might provide that the manufac-
turer should bear at least some of the costs of modification if the prod-
ucts were nonconforming before importation96 but not if the violation
occurred after importation, e.g., in the processing of the goods. With
respect to re-exportation, the contract might provide that the manufac-
turer must refund the purchase price of goods re-exported to him if he
is primarily responsible for the violation of the Act but that the manu-
facturer is under no such obligation if the violation was due to the
importer's conduct, e.g., if the importer refused to permit access to
records. In order to secure such a provision the contract might also
require the manufacturer to post a bond covering at least a portion of
the purchase price. By providing for these contingencies, the importer
can avoid becoming enmeshed in legal problems such as those described
above.
CONCLUSION
In view of the possibility that he may suffer substantial business
losses under the Consumer Product Safety Act, the importer will have
to rely on various means of avoiding or minimizing possible legal prob-
lems under the Act. He will have to familiarize himself with the ways
in which the Act regulates his conduct and take whatever steps are
necessary to comply with its provisions. This in itself, however, is insuf-
ficient for two major reasons. First, there is the possibility of error on
the Commission's part, leading to detention of the importer's goods
during tests or hearings which subsequently reveal the importer to be
in compliance with the Act. To avoid consequent business losses, the
importer should be provided some protection against such contingen-
cies; in particular, an informal hearing process at the initial stages
would help alleviate this problem. Second, the importer is subject to,
or affected by, sanctions imposed as a result of noncompliance by other
parties such as the foreign manufacturer. The Commission does not, for
example, have to allow re-exportation of seized imported goods, even
where the importer acted in good faith and was not aware of the other
party's noncompliance. To minimize these problems, the importer
should plan in advance with the other parties to avoid noncompliance
96. The foreign manufacturer could, of course, insist that once the goods are shipped
to the United States he should no longer be liable for modification costs, but importers
might be reluctant to accept such a stipulation.
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and to apportion losses in case sanctions are imposed. By taking these
steps, the importer can both protect himself against business losses and
protect the public against exposure to hazardous products.
Bernard L. Brown
